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Abstract
Why some individuals, who would clearly benefit from redistribution, do not vote for
parties offering redistributive policies, is an old puzzle of redistributive politics. Recent
work in political economy offers an explanation based on the interplay between religious
identity and party policies. Strategic parties bundle conservative moral policies with anti-
redistribution positions inducing individuals with a strong religious identity to vote based
on moral rather than economic preferences. I test this theory using micro-level data on
individuals’ vote choices in 24 recent multi- party elections in 15 Western European coun-
tries. I use an integrated model of religion, economic and moral preferences, and vote
choice, to show that religious individuals possess less liberal economic preferences, which
shapes their vote choice against redistributive parties. This holds even for individuals who
would clearly benefit from redistribution. Moreover, the redistributive vote of religious in-
dividuals is primarily based on economic not moral preferences.
∗I thank Thomas Gschwend, Pablo Beramendi, David Rueda, Elias Dinas, Jeff Gill, Ray Dutch, Francesc
Amat, Geoff Evans, Sigrid Rossteutscher, Peer Scheepers, Eelke deJong, Anja Neundorf, Evelyn Bytzek,
Julian Gerritzmann, and participants and discussants at the Nuffield College Politics Seminar, the Merton
College Seminar on Political Economy, and the EPSA annual conference 2011 for helpful discussions.
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Why do the poor not expropriate the rich? This puzzle has captured thinkers since
(at least) John Stuart Mill, who expressed the fear that “those who pay no taxes, dispos-
ing by their votes of other people’s money, have every motive to be lavish and none to
economise” and instead they “put their hands into the people’s pockets for any purpose
which they think fit to call a public one” (Mill 2007: 281). A more analytical implemen-
tation of this view is the famous model by Meltzer and Richard (1981), which is however
not well supported by empirical research (Rodrigiuez 1999; Gouveia and Masia 1998;
Moene and Wallerstein 2003). While the introduction of general suffrage in the West has
been accompanied by rising welfare state activity, the level of redistribution is far smaller
than predicted by purely self-interest based models, and a substantial number of individ-
uals make political choices that seem to contradict their economic interests (Alesina and
Giuliano 2011).
In this paper, I argue that religion plays an important role in solving this puzzle. I
build on recent research in political sociology and economics, which stresses the continu-
ing importance of the religious cleavage (e.g. Manza and Brooks 1997; Brooks and Manza
2004; Brooks et al. 2006; Elff 2007; Stegmueller et al. 2012) and the effects of religious
identity (a micro-level manifestation of religious cleavages) on conservative moral and
economic preferences (Guiso et al. 2003, 2006; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Stegmueller
et al. 2012).1 Theoretical work in political economy shows that policy interested parties
respond to these predictable micro-level patterns by bundling economic and moral poli-
cies (Roemer 1998, 2001; Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004). Combining these perspectives,
I link religion to economic preferences and to redistributive vote choice, and argue that
religious individuals refrain from voting for redistributive parties, because they are more
conservative, both morally and economically, than their secular counterparts.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next two sections, I present my argument and
testable hypotheses. Data from 24 multiparty elections in 15 Western European countries
between 1999 and 2008 is described next. I then set up a hierarchical structural model,
which allows for an explicit test of the link between religion, preferences, and redistribu-
tive voting. The following section describes the results and presents several key quantities
of interests. The final section concludes the paper. An [online] appendix contains further
robustness checks and details of the data used.
1I use the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ as they are commonly employed in Anglo-Saxon countries,
s.t. ‘liberal’ denotes ‘leftist’, pro-redistribution welfare preferences and more secular moral preferences.
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Religion, Preferences, and Voting
Political sociologists have long recognized the importance of religion for individuals’ polit-
ical choices. Following early work by Paul Lazarsfeld and colleagues on the social bases of
political behavior (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955;
Smith 2001), researchers focusing on the role of religion argue that historically rooted
patterns of church-state conflict result in stable individual level links between religiosity
and vote choice (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1968, 1971). Countering claims that
the influence of social structure on voting behavior has vanished (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992;
Knutsen 2004) a new wave of research is investigating the effect of individuals’ social lo-
cation, showing that membership or identification with social groups shapes preferences
and choices. The two most salient groups are socio-economic classes (Manza et al. 1995;
Brooks and Manza 1997; Evans 2000; Elff 2007, 2009; van der Waal et al. 2007) and reli-
gious denominations (Layman 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Manza and Brooks 1997;
De Graaf et al. 2001; Brooks and Manza 2004; Brooks et al. 2006; Elff 2007; Stegmueller
et al. 2012).
This line of research confirms arguments made by sociologists of religion, who argue
that religion is still important to individuals, even in the most secular societies (Wuthnow
1988; Madeley 1991; Wuthnow 1994; Greeley 2004; see also Inglehart 1997: 281). Thus,
in Western countries individuals “who retain their religious identity may oppose other
aspects of secularization processes, showing increasing political differences in comparison
to non-religious voters” (Brooks et al. 2006: 93, my emphasis). Rather than leading to a
decline in the importance of religion per se, secularization is hypothesized to increase the
relevance of the distinction between secular and religious individuals (Wuthnow 1988;
Olson and Green 2006).
Economic–moral policy bundling
My discussion of the importance of socio-economic class and religion suggest that eco-
nomic and moral preferences should take center stage in an analysis of redistributive vot-
ing. Further theoretical arguments can be derived from models in political economy that
link party strategies and redistribution. Individual preferences have to be implemented
by political actors to become policy; hence it is sensible to focus on individual preferences
that reflect the central dimensions of party competition.
Most workhorse political-economic models of redistribution start from a (unidimen-
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sional) economic policy dimension, on which parties position themselves in response to
the distribution of individual preferences (Mueller 2003: ch. 11; Persson and Tabellini
2000; Downs 1957). Which economic policy individuals prefer is derived from their eco-
nomic position, usually captured by income or some measure of skill or economic class
(e.g. Meltzer and Richard 1981: 917; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Moene and Waller-
stein 2003; Cusack et al. 2005; Iversen 2006). However, this setup has clear limits when
trying to capture heterogeneity in redistributive voting between individuals. Therefore,
a more complex view is offered by John Roemer (1998, 2001, 2005), who uses a two-
dimensional model of political competition. Parties compete using two issue dimensions:
an economic, redistribution dimension, and a non-economic, moral dimension (Warwick
2002, Bornschier 2010 and Kriesi 2010 provide evidence on the two-dimensionality of the
policy space in Western Europe). Parties do so because citizens do not just have simple
uni-dimensional economic preferences. In addition to their economic preferences, they
are assumed to also posses moral preferences or “principles” (Akerlof and Kranton 2000;
Roemer 2005: 514).2 But parties are not distributed uniformly in this two-dimensional
space. Rather, they offer policies in packages: if you want conservative moral policy, you
will have to ‘buy’ anti-redistribution policies as well. This is the core idea of Roemer’s
model. The spatial configuration of party policy bundles induces individual behavior,
which might seem irrational from a purely economic point of view. For example a worker
– who is assumed to be economically liberal – does not vote for a redistributive party. He
does so because he is religious and holds conservative moral preferences, which are best
represented by a conservative party.
The empirical result of this process is shown in Figure 1. It shows positions of West
European parties in a two-dimensional issue space composed of economic and moral
policies.3 Most parties seem to bundle economic and moral policy. Parties that offer
pro-redistribution policies are usually socially liberal, whereas parties that run on anti-
redistribution platforms are predominantly socially conservative. This relationship is
strong: once we know a party’s economic position, we can predict its stance on moral
issues quite well, as indicated by a linear regression coefficient of 0.64 with a rather small
standard error.4
2Clearly, in this model parties are not Downsian office-seekers but care about policies (Baron 1993;
Roemer 2001: 91f.).
3Details on the measurement of parties’ policy positions are in section “Data”.
4Running the same regression with 6 extreme points at the bottom and top (conservative Italian Christian
parties and liberal Swedish lefts) removed yields a similar regression relationship of 0.59.
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Figure 1: Party positions on moral and economic issues in 15 Western European countries
This line of reasoning posits clearly separable economic and moral preferences. Socio-
economic position determines economic preferences, and religiosity determines moral
preferences. The fact that the parties in Figure 1 scatter closely around the regression
line is a result of the strategies of political elites, who are able to induce some voters
to decide on the basis of moral instead of economic preferences (see Frank 2004 for a
popular version of this argument).
Religiosity and economic preferences
But the relationship between religion and moral and economic preferences is more com-
plex. Recent research in economics and sociology argues for a strong link between an
individual’s religiosity and his or her economic preferences (e.g Scheve and Stasavage
2006; Guiso et al. 2003, 2006; Alesina and Giuliano 2011).
Following Stegmueller et al. (2012), I conceptualize religiosity as consisting of two
(theoretically) distinct components: (1) religious identity, i.e. wether someone identifies
with one of the major christian denominations; and (2) church integration, i.e. the extent
to which he or she participates in church activities. This distinction needs to be made not
only because of its conceptual relevance (more below), but also because of the empirical
fact that many individuals identify themselves with a religious group, but do not attend
church regularly. Roughly 50 percent of Catholics and 75 percent of Protestants attend
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church only on special holy days or less. On the other hand, even in the “secular West” we
still find a substantial group of individuals who attend church every week or even more
often (12 percent of Protestants and 30 percent of Catholics).5
Religious identity has a negative effect on redistributive voting, because individuals
who identify with one of the major christian denominations hold strongly conservative
economic preferences. Stegmueller et al. (2012) argue that these are rooted in a long
history of church–state conflict over the provision of welfare (cf. Kahl 2005; Hicks 2006;
Rossteutscher 2009), which lead to a “pronounced anti welfare-state position” of churches
and parties (Manow 2002:206). Research on social identity has shown that individuals
who self-categorize themselves into a social group will adapt the norms, world-views, and
preferences that are dominant in that group (Tajfel 1981; Hogg et al. 1995; Huddy 2001).
Hence, I argue that contemporary individuals who identify themselves as religious will
hold anti-welfare and redistribution preferences. This effect of religious identity operates
even when an individual does not attend church regularly, since (i) other mechanisms such
as personal networks and parental socialization provide enough information about beliefs
and preferences among religious individuals, and (ii) the self-identification mechanism
works even in absence of social control (Abrams et al. 1990).
Church integration has a separate negative effect on redistributive voting, because in-
dividuals who are more integrated in a church community are expected to hold more
conservative economic preferences (Chen and Lind 2006; Scheve and Stasavage 2006;
Stegmueller et al. 2012). Integration into a religious community helps to insulate in-
dividuals against adverse life events, like becoming sick or unemployed, by providing
them with material and psychic resources (Pergament 1997; Pargament 2002; Clark and
Lelkes 2005). Thus, church integration and state welfare spending are substitute goods:
regular churchgoers, “irrespective of their denomination”, “privately insure themselves
via religion” and prefer less welfare provision by the state (Scheve and Stasavage 2006:
256,263).6
The previous discussion shows that religion shapes individuals’ economic and moral
preferences and helps to explain why parties are able to offer such clearly bundled eco-
nomic and moral polices. If religion plays a significant role in an individual’s vote function,
5Numbers are calculated from European Social Survey data for fifteen West European countries, de-
scribed below.
6Scheve and Stasavage (2006) describe their understanding of religion as “religious involvement” or
“degree of religiosity” (p. 257), but it is clear from their model that their argument builds on an individual’s
level of church attendance.
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no trade-off exists between voting based on economic and moral preferences, since he or
she will shun from electing redistributive parties on both moral and economic grounds.
Hypotheses
From this general discussion, I construct the following testable hypotheses about religion,
preferences and vote choice. First, following the discussion on the continuing relevance of
the religious cleavage and its micro-level manifestation, religious social identities, I expect
to find a negative effect of religious identity – self-categorizing as either Catholic or Protes-
tant – on preferences and redistributive vote choice. Thus, I formulate a set of religious
identity hypotheses: (H1a) Individuals who identify as either Catholic or Protestant are less
likely to vote for a redistributive party than their secular counterparts. This should (partly)
be the results of their distinct economic preferences, therefore I expect that individuals
who identify as either Catholic or Protestant are more likely to hold conservative economic
preferences (H1b) and are more likely to hold conservative moral preferences (H1c). A pre-
condition for this causal structure to work is that preferences shape individuals’ choices.
Therefore, I expect to find that economic and moral preferences influence vote choice (H1d).
Second, differences in religious teaching between denominations are less important
for individuals’ politico-economic preferences and choices. Rather, the defining religious
cleavage in modern societies lies between religious and secular individuals. While this is
implicit in my first hypothesis, where I refer to both Catholics and Protestants, I will test
this hypothesis more explicitly. Thus, the religious cleavage hypothesis (H2) states that
effect differences between religious and secular individuals will be larger than effect differences
between Catholics and Protestants regarding their vote choice (H2a), economic (H2b), and
moral (H2c) preferences.
Third, in addition to the effect of religious identity, church integration has a further
negative influence on the vote. Therefore, the church integration hypothesis (H3) states
that irrespective of an individuals denomination, the more an individual attends church, the
lower will be his or her propensity of voting for a redistributive party (H3a). As argued
above, this is not only the result of an individuals’ moral outlook, but also due to distinct
anti-welfare preferences caused by religious insurance. Consequently, I expect to find
that higher levels of church attendance are linked to conservative economic (H3b) and moral
(H3c) preferences.
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Data
Redistributive parties
My dependent variable is an individual’s choice of a redistributive party. Consequently,
I employ a measure of how much redistribution a party proposes in their electoral plat-
form. Using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Budge et al. 2001) and
its 2009 update (Volkens et al. 2010), I calculate the extent to which parties favor state
involvement in the economy – a measure of redistributive politics proposed by Benoit and
Laver (2006, 2007).7 It is calculated from parties’ statements to multiple economic topics
(represented by “quasi sentences” in the CMP data set), which are combined into a mea-
sure of a party’s policy position as the balance of positive (P) to negative (N) statements
(Lowe et al. 2011):
θ (L) = log
P + .5
N + .5
.
Parties can occupy any position on this scale, but more extreme positions need consider-
ably more relative emphasis, yielding a magnitude scaling of policy positions.8 This yields
interval level information on the redistributive policies of almost all European parties.9
The resulting position of parties were displayed in Figure 1. For the following analyses, I
create a binary variable indicating if the party that an individual has chosen favors redis-
tributive policies. I classify a party as redistributive if it occupies a policy position above
the country-election specific redistribution policy mean, in other words, when it proposes
more redistribution than the (hypothetical) average party.10 This operationalization takes
into account that what constitutes redistributive policy depends on a country and its cur-
rent electoral climate.
For each election between 1999 and 2008, I matched the corresponding individual
7One should note that using the CMP’s simple “left-right” measure is misleading, since it carries surplus
meaning which is not related to redistribution, such as positions on “traditional morality” (Huber and Stanig
2008). Furthermore, simply classifying parties based on their name (‘left’) does not constitute a proper
operationalization of the concept of redistributive voting, since country as well as election specific factors
influence parties’ policy positions on redistribution.
8A small constant (.5) is added to prevent problems with low numbers of quasi sentences. The resulting
party measure is insensitive to a range of choices (.1 . . . 1).
9Some small, extreme parties are not represented in the data set, since the CMP contains no information
on their position. An example is the National Democratic Party (NPD) in Germany, a nationalistic, extreme
right party. However, the number of survey respondents that chose those parties is generally negligible.
10This is the preferred strategy, since the interval level measure of party policy does not imply that zero is
a centrist position and therefore the mean is the preferred reference point (cf. Lowe et al. 2011: 131).
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level data from the European Social Survey.11 If multiple waves were available, I used the
one closest to the last election. Table A.1 in the appendix shows survey fieldwork periods
and election dates for waves included in my analysis. This yields matched elections–
survey data for 24 elections held in 15 countries providing information on vote choices of
27,941 individuals.
Individual level variables
Economic and moral issue preferences are captured by two items, both measured on a
5-point agree–disagree scale. An individual’s position on economic issues is represented
by her preferences for redistribution, measured by an item widely used in research on
redistribution preferences (e.g. Rehm 2009; Stegmueller et al. 2012). It asks respondents
to state their support for income redistribution though government activity. Its exact
question wording is “Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree
with each of the following statements”: “The government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels”. My measurement of individuals’ preferences over moral
issues is somewhat more limited. I use an item probing support for homosexual lifestyles,
which is an issue that continues to divide secular from religious respondents (Brint and
Abrutyn 2010: 329). The item’s exact wording is “... please say to what extent you
agree or disagree with the following statement: Gay men and lesbians should be free to
live their own life as they wish”. Scheepers et al. (2002) show that this homosexuality
item correlates highly with a general moral values factor, which includes attitudes to pre-
marital sex and abortion. Nonetheless, multi-item measures for both concepts would be
preferable, but are not available in the ESS.12.
An individual’s religiosity is captured by his or her denomination and frequency of
church attendance. Individuals are classified as either being Catholic or Protestant or
having no denomination.13 Church attendance is captured by a quasi metric variable
11The ESS was designed from the beginning to be comparative and it has exceptionally high standards
regarding the comparability of questionnaires, sampling designs and population coverage, making it an
ideal tool to analyze a large number of countries simultaneously. Details on sampling designs, questionnaire
translation, fieldwork and data documentation are available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
12See Ansolabehere et al. (2008) for a discussion of the general advantages of multi-item measures, and
Stegmueller (2011) for a discussion from an explicitly comparative perspective.
13The small number (4% of respondents) of individuals belonging to “other” denominations (a rather
heterogeneous group of Muslims and Eastern faiths) are grouped with “none”. Alternatively, removing
them prior to the analysis does not change results.
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for the frequency with which our respondents visit church, ranging from never to daily
attendance. Income is measured on the household level and is standardized to have a
within-country mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.14 I include social class as
a proxy for an individual’s skill level and its associated labor market risks (Cusack et al.
2005).16 I focus on the most relevant contrast, which distinguishes class positions as a
result of employment contracts (Goldthorpe 1995; Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006), dis-
tinguishing ‘working class’ individuals with wage contracts in jobs with low human capital
specificity and easy monitoring of performance, from ‘service class’ individuals in salaried
employment with high human capital specificity and difficult monitoring of performance.
Individuals who depend on the state as provider of their main source of income, have a
clear interest in high levels of public welfare provision relative to those who are working
(Alber 1984; Lepsius 1979; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Gelissen 2000; Jaeger 2006). In
line with previous research (e.g. Gelissen 2000, 2001), I include indicator variables for
being unemployed, retired, and not in the labor force. To capture further heterogeneity
between individuals, I include a respondent’s age and years of education.17 Gender differ-
ences are represented by a dummy variable for being female. Table A.2 in the appendix
shows descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables used in the analysis. I address
missing data using multiple imputation (cf. Rubin 1987; Little and Rubin 2002; King et al.
2001).18
14Respondents could give their income in weekly, monthly or annual figures. The first three waves of the
European Social Survey provide a twelve category measure of income, whereas wave four provides country
specific deciles. To create a comparable measure I standardize per country and survey wave. Note that
De La O and Rodden (2008) find that the effect of income on redistributive voting is nonlinear, especially
for the highest income group. To check for this possibility, I estimated a nonparametric model (Wood 2006;
Keele 2008) for the effect of income.15 My results show no sign of any nonlinearities, which suggests
that their finding might be a result of the income measurement employed in the World Value Survey (see
Figure A.1 in the appendix). Consequently, I specify the effect of income on redistributive voting as linear.
16I use the European Socio-economic Classification (Rose and Harrison 2010), which codes detailed
occupation-by-employment-status units into a categorical class scheme, to generate class indicators for
working and service class positions, a group of intermediate positions, which are characterized by mixed
employment contracts, and the self-employed.
17To check if a linear specification for age is appropriate, I set up a model for the direct effects, where
the age effect is estimated non-parametrically. Details are the same as for my nonparametric income model
above. Nonparametric age estimates suggesting an effect decreasing at a roughly constant rate, which
suggests that a linear specification captures the central feature of the data.
18It has been pointed out repeatedly that listwise deletion of missing cases is a poor strategy (Allison 2001;
Little and Rubin 2002; King et al. 2001). Thus, I use multiple imputation via a chained equations approach.
It imputes missing values by cycling over variables, imputing each as a function of all others. Whereas
traditional imputation methods usually assume multivariate normality for all variables, this approach tailors
each imputation equation to a variable’s measurement level (Raghunathan et al. 2001; van Buuren et al.
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Model
An appropriate model has to include variables describing an individual’s religion, socio-
economic background, and economic and moral preferences. Simply including both re-
ligion, socio-economic position and preferences on the right hand side of a regression
model will not adequately represent the hypothesized causal process (Lewis-Beck 1977;
Bartle 1998; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). I describe below the set-up of a structural model,
where an individual’s economic and moral preferences are endogenous, shaped by her
religion and socio-economic position (cf. Goldberger 1972; Winship and Mare 1983; Yuan
and MacKinnon 2009). These preferences, together with other observed characteristics,
then influence her propensity to vote for a redistributive party.
I use a latent variable formulation to map categories of observed variables onto their
underlying continuous latent variables (Heckman 1978; Albert and Chib 1993). More
precisely, for the binary vote choice variable one observes y = 1 if the latent variable y∗ is
greater or equal a threshold κ and 0 otherwise, while ordinal measures of redistribution
and moral issues with k = 4 categories are mapped onto latent variables via a set of
k − 1 estimated ordered thresholds. Thus for each ordinal variable one observes ηv =
k if κk−1,v ≤ η∗v < κk,v, (k = 1, . . . , 4, v = 1,2). I fix the scale of the latent variables
by setting errors, ε, to follow a standard normal distribution, yielding a probit equation
for vote choice and ordered probit equations for moral and economic preferences (Song
and Lee 2004). Both latent measures are oriented such that higher values indicate more
liberal economic and moral preferences.
Individual i living in country j choses a redistributive party according to the following
vote function:
y∗i j = β1x i + γ1η
∗
1i j + γ2η
∗
2i j +δ1zi1 + ξ1 j + εi1 (1)
η∗1i j = β2x i +δ2zi2 + ξ2 j + εi2 (2)
η∗2i j = β3x i +δ3zi3 + ξ3 j + εi3 (3)
Here, β1 is a vector that captures the effect of religious denomination and church atten-
dance x i, while γ1 and γ2 capture the respective effect of economic and moral preferences
2006; van Buuren 2007). To insure that reasonable values have been imputed, I employ the diagnostic
checks outlined by Abayomi et al. (2008). I compute five imputations on which the following results are
based.
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on vote choice. Controls for further individual characteristics are placed in zi with asso-
ciated regression weights δ1. Effects of religion on economic and moral preferences are
captured in β2 and β3, respectively.
19
Since unobserved heterogeneity between countries is likely to influence voting as well
as preferences, I model country differences in levels of vote choice and preferences via
country-election random effects, ξv j (Ansari et al. 2002; Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2007):
ξv j ∼ N(0,Ψξv), v = 1,2, 3
where Ψξv = diag(ψ
2
ξv1, . . . ,ψ
2
ξvJ).
20 I estimate this multilevel system of equations in a
Bayesian framework (see, in general, Gill 2008; Jackman 2009, and specifically Palomo
et al. 2007). Diffuse priors for the random effects variances are specified as draws from
an inverse gamma distribution with shape and scale parameters 0.001. Regression effects
priors are normally distributed with mean zero and variance 100, whereas priors for the
thresholds are normally distributed with mean zero and variance 10. I run a Gibbs sampler
(Spiegelhalter et al. 1997) with two chains for 200.000 iterations thinned by a factor of
10, and base inferences on the second half of the chains.21
Results
While I will calculate more easily interpretable quantities below, a look at the raw coeffi-
cients, as shown in Table 1, yields the core structure of my results. Column Eq.1 shows
19Further controls are captured by effects δ2,δ3 for covariate vectors zi2 and zi3. Since I estimate all
binary and ordered probit thresholds, I do not include intercepts. Furthermore, the model implies uncorre-
lated residuals ε (Winship and Mare 1983: 75). In the online appendix I present a robust specification with
instruments in zi2 and zi3.
20A more complex specification allows for correlations between the three different intercepts, modeled
using a variance covariance matrix with an inverse Wishart distribution as its hyperprior. More specifically,
I estimated ξv· ∼ N(0,Ψ) with Ψ ∼ W−1(I3, 4). However, this analysis has shown that no substantial
correlation exists. The covariance between voting and economic preferences is 0.046 (with a standard
error or 0.05), between voting and moral preferences it is 0.008 (0.039), and between economic and moral
preferences −0.005 (0.029). Therefore, I retain the somewhat simpler (and computationally faster) model
specification.
21Diagnostic suggested by Gelman and Rubin (1992) and Cowles and Carlin (1996) indicate that both
chains mix well and do not show signs of absence of convergence. I conducted several sensitivity analyses, to
check the robustness of my results against different prior specifications. As an alternative prior for variances
I use a prior that is uniform on the standard deviation as suggested by Gelman (2006). To check the prior
sensitivity of thresholds and regression coefficients, I use priors with variances twice as large. In all cases I
obtained the same model results.
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the direct effects of preferences and individual characteristics on redistributive vote choice
(cf. equation 1 above), while columns Eq.2 and Eq.3 show how individual characteristics
shape moral and economic preferences, respectively, and thus indirectly influence redis-
tributive voting. One immediately notices that both economic and moral preferences play
an important role in shaping redistributive vote choice. Individuals who hold liberal,
pro-redistribution preferences and have liberal moral views are more likely to vote for a
redistributive party. Thus hypothesis H1c – which is the prerequisite for all further discus-
sion – clearly holds: moral and economic conservatism is linked with a lower propensity
to vote for a redistributive party.
As argued above, these preferences are endogenous and shaped by an individual’s re-
ligion. As column two and three show, Catholics and Protestants are significantly more
morally and economically conservative than the secular population, confirming the reli-
gious identity hypotheses, H1a & H1b. Therefore, in addition to the direct effects of religion
on voting (as given in eq.1), religious identity also exerts a negative effect on the redis-
tributive vote, channeled via economic and moral preferences, thus confirming hypothesis
H1d.22
Estimates of denomination effects in Table 1 already hint that effect differences be-
tween Catholic and Protestant are rather small – which was claimed by the religious
cleavage hypotheses. A stricter test is presented in Figure 2, which test effect differences
between Catholics and Protestants for each equation. Shown are estimated differences to-
gether with their associated 95% credible intervals.23 The difference is considerable larger
for vote choice and moral preferences than for economic preferences, but in each case the
absolute magnitude is negligible. Furthermore all credible intervals contain zero, show-
ing that these differences are statistically insignificant. This confirms the religious cleavage
hypotheses for both preferences and vote choice H2a-H2c and shows the importance of
religious–secular differences for political preferences and choices.
I now turn from identity to behavior and examine the church integration hypotheses.
We see that higher levels of church attendance go hand in hand with more conservative
economic and moral preferences, as was predicted by hypotheses H3a and H3b. Con-
22These effects are with church attendance held constant. I will relax this strict linear additive specifica-
tion in section below, in order to examine how religious identity and church integration interact.
23Credible intervals are the Bayesian analogue to the frequentist confidence interval. However, owing to
the straightforward meaning of posterior probability in Bayesian analysis, they actually can be interpreted
as region of confidence, i.e. the 95% probability that the effect difference lies in this region (Bernardo and
Smith 2000; Jaynes 1976).
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Table 1: Structural model of redistributive party choice as function of re-
ligion and issue preferences. Estimates (posterior means) and standard
errors (posterior standard deviation) from Bayesian hierarchical structural
model.
Eq 1: Vote Eq 2: Economic Eq 3: Moral
est se est se est se
Preferences:
Economic 0.247 0.007
Moral 0.130 0.007
Denomination:a
Catholic −0.185 0.017 −0.098 0.014 −0.053 0.014
Protestant −0.162 0.017 −0.099 0.014 −0.072 0.014
Attendance −0.040 0.005 −0.019 0.004 −0.150 0.004
Income −0.068 0.007 −0.147 0.006 0.013 0.006
Education 0.005 0.002 −0.013 0.001 0.027 0.001
Female 0.052 0.012 0.167 0.010 0.312 0.010
Age −0.022 0.005 0.018 0.004 −0.094 0.004
Social class:b
Service 0.039 0.016 −0.111 0.013 0.114 0.013
Working 0.121 0.015 0.079 0.013 −0.031 0.013
Self-employed −0.280 0.023 −0.174 0.018 −0.052 0.019
Transfer class:c
Unemployed 0.024 0.034 0.107 0.028 −0.055 0.028
Retired −0.069 0.019 −0.002 0.016 −0.080 0.016
Not in LF −0.067 0.017 −0.049 0.014 −0.013 0.014
Country-election variance components
Variance 0.276 0.063 0.137 0.032 0.068 0.016
VPC 0.215 0.037 0.120 0.024 0.064 0.014
Note: VPC denotes variance partition coefficient calculated after Goldstein (2010) method D. Estimated
thresholds for binary probit equation: −0.273; for ordinal probit redistribution equation: (−1.090, −0.614,
0.722); for ordinal probit moral equation: (−1.853, −1.309, 0.038). Based on 20,000 MCMC samples.
Calculated using five imputations of ESS data, N=27941. Multiple imputation standard errors calculated
according to Rubin 1987.
a Reference category is no/other denomination.
b Reference category is intermediate/no class.
c Reference category is paid employment.
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Figure 2: Effect differences between denominations
sequently, we see that regular churchgoers have a lowered probability of voting for a
redistributive party, thus confirming hypothesis H3c. However, in contrast to religious
identity, which has a stronger impact on economic than on moral preferences, the effect
of church attendance in the moral preferences equation is seven times larger than for
economic preferences. This raises the suspicion that, contrary to the religious insurance
argument (Scheve and Stasavage 2006), the main mechanism linking church integration
and redistributive non-voting is not based on economic preferences (I will examine this
question in more detail below).
Finally, estimates of an individual’s socio-economic position in Table 1 confirm ex-
pected relationships. Individuals with higher incomes are slightly more socially liberal
than the general population, but they are decidedly more economically conservative and
have a lower propensity to vote for a redistributive party. The effect of education on eco-
nomic preferences is much smaller but still negative and different from zero, while it is
larger for moral preferences.24 As expected, I find that individuals in service and working
class occupations differ sharply from one another in their economic preferences. Working
class individuals hold liberal economic preferences, whereas individuals in service class
occupations are economically conservative. With regard to moral preferences, even after
controlling for education, members of the service class are liberal while working class
members are socially conservative (Lipset 1959). In contrast, the self-employed show a
clear distaste for liberal, redistributive economic policy and are less socially liberal than
the reference group (individuals in intermediate employment positions). Effects are less
clear among members of the service class. Individuals who are currently unemployed
prefer a more liberal economic policy than individuals who are currently in paid employ-
ment. On the other hand, those not in the labor force (a rather mixed group containing
24For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between income and vote choice see De La O and
Rodden 2008, Gelman et al. 2008 and Gelman et al. 2010.
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students) hold more conservative economic preferences. After controlling for education
and income, retired individuals do not differ from the working population in their eco-
nomic preferences; however, they are more socially conservative even after taking into
account the negative effect of age. Finally, I find that women hold more liberal economic
and moral preferences than men, taking their socio-economic characteristics into account.
The final two rows of Table 1 show that there exists a good deal of unobserved het-
erogeneity between countries, especially with regard to vote choice and economic pref-
erences. By calculating the variance partition coefficient (often called intra class corre-
lation), we see that almost 22 percent of unexplained variance in vote choice is due to
country differences; the corresponding numbers for economic and moral preferences are
twelve and six percent, respectively. Even so, this country heterogeneity does not distort
my results (more details on robustness checks can be found in the appendix).
Religion and redistributive voting
I will now take a closer look at the effect of religious identity and church attendance on
redistributive voting. To allow for an easier interpretation of effects, I calculate predicted
probabilities of voting for a redistributive party for an average individual. More precisely,
I hold all socio-economic controls at their mean and use the denomination specific mean
level of church attendance to take into account that Catholics and Protestants differ in
their average level of church attendance. In a second specification, I use the 10th and
90th percentile of church attendance to capture the effect of religious identification among
regular churchgoers and non-churchgoers. These calculations result in Figure 3, which
shows differences in predicted probabilities between Catholics or Protestants and their
secular counterparts.
Looking at its upper half shows again the relevance of religious identity: holding all
other individual characteristics constant, religious identity reduces the probability of vot-
ing for a redistributive party by about ten percentage points. Still, contrary to my the-
oretical argument, religious identity may only be relevant for highly church integrated
individuals who show up in church each Sunday. The lower part of Figure 3 suggests that
this is not the case. Not surprisingly, I do find that effect differences are stronger among
regular churchgoers (those who attend church at least once a week), who differ from
secular individuals by about thirteen percentage points. But even among individuals who
never attend church (not even on special holy days), religious identification has a clear
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Figure 3: Total effect of religious identity and church attendance on redistributive voting.
First differences in predicted probabilities of voting for a redistributive party between
religious and secular individuals at different levels of church attendance.
effect, which leads to a difference from secular individuals of roughly seven percentage
points.
Is this effect of religion a general force influencing political decisions, or does it depend
on one’s socio-economic position? For example, Gelman et al. (2008) find that religion
(which they operationalize as church attendance) matters mainly for high income voters.
On the other hand there is the notion of lower class people being “preoccupied” with reli-
gion instead of economic matters. To assess the role of religious identification in different
social strata, I again calculate first denomination differences in predicted probabilities of
voting for a redistributive party for four “socio-economic ideal types”: (1) a member of
the working class, with below average income and low education; (2) someone in an
intermediate class position (and respective education and income); (3) a member of the
professional or service class, who obtains above average income and has higher educa-
tion; and (4) someone who is self-employed, typically with slightly lower education and
income than members of the service class. The results are clear. Among all four ideal
types, religious identification lowers the probability of voting for a redistributive party
by ten percentage points (after rounding to full decimals).25 In other words, religion is
important, irrespective of one’s position on the socio-economic ladder.
25Exact differences in predicted probabilities are (s.e. in parentheses): −9.92 (0.52) for workers, −10.08
(0.51) for intermediate occupations, −10.07 (0.51) for member s of the service class, and −9.82 (0.53) for
the self-employed.
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The role of economic and moral preferences
I now take a closer look religion’s indirect effects, i.e. how it shapes voting via prefer-
ences.26 Indirect effects, shown in Table 2, quantify the effects of covariates on vote choice
mediated via economic and moral preferences. Those estimates are somewhat harder to
interpret since they are on the (standardized) scale of the latent preference variables. A
more intuitive measure of the importance of preferences is given in the ‘percent mediated’
columns. There I calculate how much of the total effect of a covariate on the propensity
to vote for a redistributive party is due to economic and moral preferences, respectively
(Ditlevsen et al. 2005).27
Looking over the coefficients describing indirect effects, I find a pattern that is to be
expected from my previous results: both economic and moral preferences are relevant
factors between social position and the redistributive vote. For economic variables, such
as income, education or being in an (dis-) advantageous labor market position, Table 2 in-
dicates that the proportion mediated by preferences is larger for economic characteristics
compared to religion. However, it is less surprising to find that income is strongly related
to redistributive voting via economic preferences, than to find that economic preferences
matter significantly for religious individuals as well. Indeed, I find that while for both
Catholics and Protestants, economic and moral issues are relevant in determining voting,
economics is more important than morals: the percentage of religion’s mediated effect is
two to three times larger in the economic preferences equation. Contrarily, for individuals
who attend church more regularly, moral issues (or, more precisely, homosexuality) is a
more important factor.28
However, a strict statistical test of the relevance of economic vis-a-vis moral preferences
26It is worth stressing that the model specification is based on the theoretically implied order of effects, in
other words, one expects that social position shapes preferences and ultimately vote choice. However, as one
of my reviewers suggests, for a subset of individuals the reverse might be true, e.g., changes in their moral
preferences affect their propensity to identify with a Christian denomination. To differentiate between these
possibilities further research in single countries using repeated observations, such as household panel data,
will be needed.
27Calculating the proportion of denomination effects explained by preferences is done as follows. Let d
be a dummy indicating the column of x giving the denomination of individual i and β·d the associated effect
coefficient. Then the proportions pi of the effect of denomination mediated by moral issue or redistribution
preferences is given by (Ditlevsen et al. 2005; MacKinnon et al. 2007): piη∗1,d = γ1β2d/(β1d + γ1β2d) and
piη∗2,d = γ2β3d/(β1d + γ1β3d).
28As one of my reviewers rightly pointed out, one could expect the relevance of moral (and possible
economic) preferences to rise if more detailed measures, covering a broader range of issues, would be
available.
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Table 2: Effects of endogenous economic and moral preferences. Estimates (pos-
terior means) and standard errors (posterior standard deviation) from Bayesian
hierarchical structural model.
Economic preferences Moral preferences
Percent Percent
Indirect effect mediated Indirect effect mediated
est se est se est se est se
Denomination:a
Catholic −0.243 0.035 12 2 −0.068 0.019 4 1
Protestant −0.245 0.035 13 2 −0.093 0.019 5 1
Attendance −0.046 0.010 10 2 −0.195 0.011 33 3
Income −0.364 0.018 35 3 0.017 0.008 2 1
Education −0.033 0.004 42 10 0.035 0.003 44 10
Female 0.413 0.027 45 6 0.407 0.025 45 7
Age 0.045 0.010 17 5 −0.123 0.008 36 6
Social class:b
Service −0.274 0.032 44 12 0.148 0.019 30 12
Working 0.196 0.031 14 3 −0.040 0.017 3 1
Self-employed −0.428 0.047 13 2 −0.068 0.025 2 1
Transfer class:c
Unemployed 0.265 0.069 51 21 −0.072 0.036 26 21
Retired −0.006 0.040 5 4 −0.104 0.022 14 5
Not in LF −0.120 0.035 16 6 −0.017 0.019 3 3
Note: Calculated from estimates in Table 1. Latent endogenous variables scaled by a factor of 10. Multiple imputation
standard errors adjusted according to Rubin 1987. Based on 20,000 MCMC samples.
a Reference category is no/other denomination.
b Reference category is intermediate/no class.
c Reference category is paid employment.
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Figure 4: Difference between percent mediated by economic and moral issues.
needs to be based on their relative differences. Thus, for each relevant social character-
istic, I calculate the difference between the percentage mediated by economic and moral
preferences. These differences together with their corresponding 95% credible intervals
are shown in Figure 4. Here, difference estimates which are significantly smaller than
zero indicate that moral issues are more important in explaining the effects of a social
characteristic on vote choice, while estimates significantly greater than zero indicate a
greater importance of economic preferences.
For both Catholics and Protestants, economic preferences play a larger role than moral
issues in determining their redistributive party choice. The difference in relevance is
8 percentage points with 95% intervals that do not cross zero – indicating that this is
a statistically reliable finding. This result once more underscores the credibility of the
religious identity hypothesis, which links religious identity to economic preferences and to
vote choice.
The opposite picture emerges for the role of church attendance. It shapes an indi-
vidual’s vote choice more through its effect on moral preferences: the proportion of an
individual’s choice for a redistributive party mediated by moral preferences is three times
as large as that mediated by economic ones. The calculated difference in Figure 4 illus-
trates that church attendance has a significantly stronger indirect effect via moral than
economic preferences. It’s estimated difference is only surpassed in relative magnitude
by the role of income, whose effect on vote choice operates almost exclusively through
economic preferences. Thus, while there exists a significant link between church integra-
tion, economic preferences and redistribute vote choice, as I have argued following the
religious insurance argument by Scheve and Stasavage (2006), the major factor shaping
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redistributive non-voting among churchgoing citizens is their moral conservatism. Thus,
it seems that integration in a moral community, like a local church, increases the salience
of moral issues to such an extent that they become a determining factor in individuals’
vote choice. A reverse causal explanation is, of course, that those morally conservative
individuals to whom social-moral political issues are of high importance choose to at-
tend church more regularly. However, in both scenarios the economic insurance aspect of
church integration is less relevant than expected by the religious insurance argument.
Conclusion
In this paper, I tackled the question, why individuals do note vote for redistributive parties
(Roemer 1998). I focus on a micro-level explanation, arguing that religion plays a cru-
cial role in ‘preventing’ individuals from voting for parties offering redistribution policies.
The role of religion is twofold. First, and not surprisingly, it shapes individuals’ moral
preferences. Religious individuals hold more conservative positions on moral issues, and
living in increasingly secularized societies they turn to conservative parties which promise
to implement such conservative policies. Second, and more importantly, religion does
shape individuals’ economic preferences. Those who identify with one of the major chris-
tian denominations hold clear anti-welfare views and prefer more conservative economic
policies. Therefore, they are are less likely to vote for a redistributive party, irrespective
of other socio-economic characteristics. This identity effect of religion does not differ
between Catholics and Protestants, substantiating the argument that in a secular environ-
ment, the main cleavage lies between religious and secular individuals. My findings are
based on an explicit structural model (as called for by e.g. Bartle 1998). Thus, in contrast
to an earlier study of religion, economic, and moral preferences and voting by De La O
and Rodden (2008), this allows me to specify an explicit causal pathway from religion
to preferences and vote choice, and to assert the higher relative importance of economic
preferences vis-a-vis moral ones.
Observed vote choices which might be depicted as going against individuals ‘obvious’
interests (Frank 2004), like a religious worker, who does not prefer redistributive polices
(Bartels 2005), are far from irrational or erratic. They are a consequent choice based on
strongly held economic and moral preferences resulting from one’s social identity. Even
in the secular societies of Western Europe, religion still plays a major role in defining a
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yardstick on which (some) individuals orient their beliefs and preferences.29
My findings suggest that even for scholars studying advanced welfare states, religion
is a topic that should not be neglected. Religious individuals hold distinct preferences and
they cast their vote in predictable ways. Their preferences are bound to be reflected in
social policies and in parties’ strategies, since they are more likely than secular citizens
to show up at the polls.30 Understanding the role of religion in shaping policy, and how
policy itself shapes identities and preferences will add another facet to our understanding
of socio-structural and political sources of social inequality.
29One should note that the current results are limited to Western European countries, although the theo-
retical argument is general and should hold for other advanced industrialized countries as well (cf. Roemer
1998). It is also possible that other dimensions of conflict, e.g. race in the U.S., overshadow religion’s
salience. However this is beyond the scope of the current paper.
30The odds of turnout are roughly 50% higher for religious individuals, controlling for age, income,
education, social class and gender (calculated from ESS data used in this paper).
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Survey fieldwork periods and corresponding elections used in the analysis
Country Survey fieldwork periods (dd.mm.yy) Election dates (dd.mm.yy)
Austria 02.02.03-30.09.03 24.11.02
Belgium 01.10.02-30.04.03; 04.10.04-31.01.05 13.06.99; 18.05.03
Denmark 28.10.02-19.06.03; 19.09.06-02.05.07 20.11.01; 8.02.05
Finland 09.09.02-10.12.02 21.03.99
France 15.09.03-15.12.03; 28.09.08-31.01.09 09./16.06.02; 10./17.06.07
Germany 20.11.02-16.05.03; 01.09.06-15.01.07 22.09.02; 18.09.05
Great Britain 24.09.02-04.02.03; 05.09.06-14.01.07 07.06.01; 05.05.05
Ireland 11.12.02-12.04.03 17.05.02
Italy 13.01.03-30.06.03 13.05.01;
Luxembourg 14.04.03-14.08.03 13.06.99
Netherlands 01.09.02-24.02.03; 11.09.04-19.02.05 15.05.02; 22.01.03
Norway 16.09.02-17.01.03 10.09.01
Spain 19.11.02-20.02.03; 27.09.04-31.01.05; 12.03.00; 14.03.04;
05.09.08-31.01.09 09.03.08
Sweden 23.09.02-20.12.02 15.09.02
Switzerland 09.09.02-08.02.03; 15.09.04-28.02.05 24.10.99; 19.10.03
Note: Not all ESS waves that corresponded to an election are used, because of non-available CMP data on
party positions.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables.
%
Range Mean SD imputed
Preferences
Economic 1–5 3.62 1.08 1.6
Moral 1–5 4.03 1.00 2.0
Income (std.) −3.85/3.92 0.07 0.99 17.8
Education (years) 5 – 19 12.60 4.13 1.1
Age (years) 18–102 49.90 16.90 0.3
Gender (female) 0/1 0.52 0.0
Denomination:a 4.6
Catholic 0/1 0.32
Protestant 0/1 0.24
Church attendance 1–7 2.45 1.50 0.2
Social class:b 0.0
Working 0/1 0.28
Service 0/1 0.33
Self-employed 0/1 0.09
Transfer class:c 0.6
Unemployed 0/1 0.03
Retired 0/1 0.26
Not in labor force 0/1 0.17
a Reference category is no/other denomination (of which 40% are no denomination, 4% belong
to other, non-christian religions)
b Reference category is intermediate/no class
c Reference category is currently in employment
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Figure A.1: Nonparametric estimate of income effect
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Robustness tests
There might exist substantial country variation in both vote choice and preference equa-
tions, and effects of, say, being Catholic or Protestant on redistribution preferences might
vary strongly between countries. This heterogeneity might indicate that general state-
ments about direction and magnitude of effects given in the main paper are misleading
(cf. Morgan and Winship 2010). Therefore, I estimate a model that allows for unobserved
country heterogeneity of my central variables by including varying effect coefficients. To
simplify notation, let γ= (γ1,γ2). Now the model defined above is extended by specifying
country-varying effects of preferences and religion on vote choice:
γ j ∼ N(µγ,Ψγ)
β1 j ∼ N(µβ ,Ψβ),
where again Ψγ = diag(ψ2γ1, . . . ,ψ
2
γJ) and Ψγ = diag(ψ
2
β1, . . . ,ψ
2
βJ). Just like the pre-
viously estimated models, it allows for country differences in levels of vote choice and
preferences. The new additions are several random coefficients which allow for further
unobserved country heterogeneity in effects of preferences and religion on vote choice.
This provides an interesting specification test of my previous model. Country differences
in the effects of religion and preferences might be so large that my previous statements
regarding their effects are invalidated by a model that includes random coefficients. Com-
paring the results in Table A.3 to the estimates of Table 1, suggest that this is not the
case. While unexplained country differences exist for both economic and moral prefer-
ences, their estimated average effects are nearly identical to my previous model, and the
estimated variance components show that the effect of economic and moral preferences
on redistributive voting remains substantial and quite similar over countries.
Coefficients for Catholics and Protestants show larger variations, with the Protestant
effect now being 40 percent larger than before, and the Catholic effect showing con-
siderable across-country variance. Nonetheless, the effects of both being Catholic and
Protestant remain negative and statistically different from zero in all cases. Does the re-
ligious cleavage hypothesis still hold up given the larger difference we now see between
Catholics and Protestants? I calculate the effect difference between Catholics and Protes-
tants, which yields a difference of 0.066 with a standard error of 0.073. This signifies
that even under this considerably more flexible specification the difference between de-
nominations is not statistically different from zero, and the main dividing line is between
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Table A.3: Varying effects of preferences and reli-
gion over countries. Means and variation of ran-
dom coefficients. Estimates (posterior means) and
standard errors (posterior standard deviation).
Means Variation
est se est se
Preferences:
Economic 0.238 0.022 0.021 0.005
Moral 0.137 0.019 0.014 0.004
Denomination:
Catholic −0.167 0.055 0.109 0.032
Protestant −0.233 0.049 0.063 0.024
Attendance −0.043 0.017 0.013 0.003
Intercept 0 0.229 0.059
Notes: Remaining individual level estimates are similar to those in Ta-
ble 1 and not shown for reasons of space. Based on 20,000 MCMC sam-
ples. Calculated using five imputations of ESS data, standard errors ad-
justed according to Rubin 1987.
religious and secular individuals. This lends additional evidence for the religious cleavage
hypothesis.
An alternative robustness check considers influential countries (Van der Meer et al.
2010). I employ the logic of jackknifing, which removes cases one-by-one, each time
re-estimating the model (Wu 1986; Van der Leeden et al. 2008). Following this idea, I
re-estimated my model 75 times (15 times for each of 5 multiply imputed data sets) each
time removing one country. To obtain final results, I average estimates over 75 runs, and
penalize standard errors for increased variation between estimates. Results are given in
Table A.4. I find somewhat larger standard errors, but the substantive magnitude and
significance of all relevant effects remains unchanged.
Analyses in the main text of the paper pool respondents with no and ‘other’ denomi-
nations. To check if this influences my results, Table A.5 shows estimates from a model
where respondents which belong to a non-Christian denomination are excluded. Results
are virtually indistinguishable from those used in the main text.
Finally, Table A.6 shows a model with more robust identification, adding welfare poli-
cies effects for economic preferences (cf. Stegmueller et al. 2012) and the existence of
liberal laws regarding homosexuality – allowing marriage and adoption – (cf. van den
Akker et al. 2012) for moral preferences, with additional exclusion restrictions for the re-
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Table A.4: Country-jacknifed estimates of structural model of redistribu-
tive party choice as function of religion and issue preferences. Estimates
(posterior means) and standard errors (posterior standard deviation).
Eq 1: Vote Eq 2: Economic Eq 3: Moral
est se est se est se
Preferences:
Economic 0.247 0.007
Moral 0.130 0.007
Denomination:
Catholic −0.186 0.018 −0.098 0.014 −0.053 0.015
Protestant −0.162 0.017 −0.099 0.015 −0.072 0.014
Attendance −0.040 0.005 −0.019 0.004 −0.150 0.004
Income −0.067 0.007 −0.147 0.006 0.013 0.007
Education 0.005 0.002 −0.013 0.001 0.027 0.001
Female 0.052 0.013 0.167 0.010 0.312 0.010
Age −0.022 0.005 0.019 0.004 −0.094 0.004
Social class:
Service 0.039 0.016 −0.111 0.013 0.114 0.013
Working 0.120 0.016 0.080 0.013 −0.031 0.013
Self-employed −0.281 0.024 −0.173 0.019 −0.052 0.020
Transfer class:
Unemployed 0.025 0.035 0.106 0.029 −0.055 0.029
Retired −0.069 0.020 −0.003 0.017 −0.080 0.017
Not in LF −0.067 0.018 −0.048 0.014 −0.013 0.015
Country-election variance components
Variance 0.279 0.067 0.137 0.033 0.069 0.017
Note: Based on 10,000 MCMC samples. Calculated on 45 data-sets (15 jacknifed sets * 5 imputations).
Multiple imputation standard errors calculated according to Rubin 1987.
a Reference category is no denomination.
b Reference category is intermediate/no class.
c Reference category is paid employment.
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Table A.5: Estimates of structural model of redistributive party choice as
function of religion and issue preferences calculated dropping individuals
with “other” denomination, N=26,873. Estimates (posterior means) and
standard errors (posterior standard deviation).
Eq 1: Vote Eq 2: Economic Eq 3: Moral
est se est se est se
Preferences:
Economic 0.247 0.007
Moral 0.135 0.007
Denomination:a
Catholic −0.162 0.018 −0.095 0.014 −0.100 0.015
Protestant −0.135 0.017 −0.101 0.014 −0.116 0.014
Attendance −0.049 0.005 −0.019 0.004 −0.133 0.004
Income −0.068 0.007 −0.146 0.006 0.011 0.007
Education 0.005 0.002 −0.013 0.001 0.026 0.002
Female 0.056 0.013 0.168 0.010 0.317 0.010
Age −0.018 0.005 0.021 0.004 −0.100 0.004
Social class:b
Service 0.038 0.016 −0.110 0.013 0.113 0.013
Working 0.118 0.016 0.077 0.013 −0.027 0.013
Self-employed −0.292 0.024 −0.177 0.019 −0.045 0.020
Transfer class:c
Unemployed 0.011 0.035 0.112 0.028 −0.032 0.029
Retired −0.076 0.020 −0.008 0.016 −0.074 0.017
Not in LF −0.070 0.018 −0.049 0.014 −0.002 0.015
Country-election variance components
Variance 0.278 0.064 0.135 0.031 0.069 0.016
Note: Based on 20,000 MCMC samples. Calculated on five random subsamples of ESS data. Multiple impu-
tation standard errors calculated according to Rubin 1987.
a Reference category is no denomination.
b Reference category is intermediate/no class.
c Reference category is paid employment.
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maining equations. Another strategy to check for (local) non-identification is to randomly
remove parts of the data, re-estimate the model several times, and penalize standard
errors for varying coefficient estimates. Results of this procedure are given in Table A.7,
which shows estimates and standard errors from 5 subsets of data, generated by randomly
deleting one-third of all cases. Both strategies lead to virtually identical results compared
to the specification used in the main paper.
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Table A.6: Structural model of redistributive party choice as function of religion
and issue preferences. Estimates (posterior means) and standard errors (posterior
standard deviation) from Bayesian hierarchical structural equation model.
Eq 1: Vote Eq 2: Economic Eq 3: Moral
est se est se est se
Preferences:
Economic 0.247 0.006
Moral 0.130 0.007
Denomination:a
Catholic −0.185 0.017 −0.100 0.014 −0.052 0.014
Protestant −0.162 0.017 −0.098 0.014 −0.072 0.014
Attendance −0.040 0.005 −0.018 0.004 −0.150 0.004
Income −0.067 0.007 −0.148 0.006 0.013 0.006
Education 0.005 0.002 −0.013 0.001 0.027 0.001
Female 0.052 0.012 0.167 0.010 0.312 0.010
Age −0.022 0.005 0.019 0.004 −0.095 0.004
Social class:b
Service 0.039 0.016 −0.110 0.013 0.114 0.013
Working 0.120 0.015 0.080 0.013 −0.031 0.013
Self-employed −0.280 0.023 −0.173 0.019 −0.052 0.019
Transfer class:c
Unemployed 0.025 0.034 0.107 0.028 −0.055 0.028
Retired −0.069 0.019 −0.003 0.016 −0.079 0.016
Not in LF −0.067 0.017 −0.049 0.014 −0.013 0.014
Welfare policy:
socialist—liberal −0.153 0.058
conservative 0.266 0.057
Liberal homosexuality law 0.129 0.060
Country-election variance components
Variance 0.278 0.064 0.093 0.023 0.068 0.016
Note: Based on 20,000 MCMC samples. Calculated using five imputations of ESS data, N=27941. Multiple imputation
standard errors calculated according to Rubin 1987.
a Reference category is no/other denomination.
b Reference category is intermediate/no class.
c Reference category is paid employment.
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Table A.7: Estimates of structural model of redistributive party choice as
function of religion and issue preferences calculated on five random sub-
samples, N=18,442. Estimates (posterior means) and standard errors (pos-
terior standard deviation).
Eq 1: Vote Eq 2: Economic Eq 3: Moral
est se est se est se
Preferences: 0.246 0.010
Economic 0.132 0.012
Moral
Denomination:a
Catholic −0.187 0.028 −0.100 0.019 −0.055 0.018
Protestant −0.162 0.030 −0.105 0.018 −0.082 0.019
Attendance −0.039 0.008 −0.018 0.007 −0.148 0.005
Income −0.070 0.012 −0.149 0.007 0.015 0.009
Education 0.005 0.002 −0.013 0.002 0.027 0.002
Female 0.050 0.020 0.173 0.019 0.316 0.014
Age −0.023 0.007 0.017 0.009 −0.095 0.006
Social class:b
Service 0.048 0.024 −0.109 0.020 0.115 0.017
Working 0.126 0.024 0.074 0.023 −0.025 0.020
Self-employed −0.266 0.038 −0.176 0.029 −0.047 0.032
Transfer class:c
Unemployed 0.042 0.055 0.115 0.053 −0.047 0.043
Retired −0.064 0.029 −0.001 0.027 −0.069 0.022
Not in LF −0.059 0.024 −0.072 0.024 −0.015 0.027
Country-election variance components
Variance 0.278 0.064 0.137 0.033 0.066 0.016
Note: Based on 20,000 MCMC samples. Calculated on five random subsamples of ESS data. Multiple impu-
tation standard errors calculated according to Rubin 1987.
a Reference category is no/other denomination.
b Reference category is intermediate/no class.
c Reference category is paid employment.
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